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A full understanding of the negative impact of economic inequality must consider the perspective of 
those at the bottom of society. This chapter focuses on how the experience of low socioeconomic 
status shapes decision-making processes. It begins with the assumption that life on a low income in 
an unequal society involves exposure to resource scarcity, instability, and low subjective social 
status. It argues that these conditions act as socioecological cues, triggering a ‘psychological shift’ in 
the domains of appraisal (lowering perceived personal control), regulation (inducing a focus on the 
present and on threats), and cognition (tuning cognitive resources toward addressing pressing 
needs). These psychological shifts, and the resulting decision-making patterns, can be understood as 
adaptive in the context of socioeconomic threat, even if they have harmful long-term consequences.  
Developing a systematic understanding of them thus enables us to chart some of the more subtle, yet 
pervasive, influences of the related societal conditions of poverty and inequality.  
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Although popular accounts of the negative social consequences of inequality (see Wilkinson & Pickett, 2009, 
2018) highlight its harmful effect on all members of society, there is no doubt that the greatest sufferers are 
those at the very bottom. Indeed, as the gap in income between the richest and poorest of a country widens, so 
do these groups become increasingly distant in terms of a range of important life outcomes. For example, the 
disparity in life expectancy between people falling into the lowest and highest socioeconomic categories is 
enhanced in more unequal countries (Wilkinson, 1997), just as the difference in educational outcomes between 
those same groups continues to grow (Reardon, 2013). Conversely, it is those outcomes which already have a 
socioeconomic gradient (such as physical health and educational achievement) that are found to be most 
sensitive to the damaging effects of inequality (Wilkinson & Pickett, 2009). If we want to understand the 
processes underlying the impact of inequality in any one society, therefore, we need to have a mechanistic 
account of how individual psychology is shaped by one’s socioeconomic position within that society.  
Such an account is made more urgent by the predominance of claims about the supposed abilities and attitudes 
of low income groups, found in media, political, and even academic discourse. Public opinion allocates 
substantial blame for poverty on individual failures (Bullock, Williams, & Limbert, 2003), while there is no 
shortage of soap operas, reality shows, tabloid newspapers, and political speeches portraying those in receipt 
of welfare benefits as making little effort to improve their situation (Bullock, Fraser Wyche, & Williams, 2001; 
MacDonald, Shildrick, & Furlong, 2014; McKendrick, Sinclair, Irwin, O’Donnell, Scott,, & Dobbie, 2008; Paris, 
2008; see also Augoustinos & Callaghan, Chapter XX; Fiske & Durante, Chapter XX).   
Meanwhile, scholars from across the social sciences report on decision-making patterns exhibited to a greater 
extent by those low in socioeconomic status (SES), which are observed to exacerbate their poor socioeconomic 
position (for reviews, see Bertrand, Mullainathan, & Shafir, 2004; Pepper & Nettle, 2017; Sidanius & Pratto, 
1999). It has been reported, for example, that the lower one is in SES, the more likely one is to engage in 
unhealthy behaviours such as smoking (Pampel, Krueger, & Denney, 2010; Stringhini et al., 2010), even where 
such behaviours cost money. Those living on very low incomes (compared to those on middle incomes) often 
spend a greater proportion of their income on luxury goods or servicing high interest loans (Bertrand et al., 
2004; see also Brown-Iannuzzi & McKee, Chapter XX), actions that can act to cement a situation of financial 
strain or indebtedness. At the same time, the poorest groups in societies such as the United States are said to be 
less likely to behave in ways that enhance their long-term well-being, such as investing effort in education 
(Ready, 2010; Walpole, 2003) and taking out insurance or savings accounts (Bertrand et al., 2004). The 
resulting portrait of those living in relative poverty in rich, unequal countries is of a puzzling tendency to make 
decisions that further entrench their position at the bottom of society. 
In order to narrow the gap in outcomes between the winners and losers of inequality and to understand the 
behaviours that may contribute to it, we need to take seriously the perspective of those at the bottom of society. 
This chapter does so by considering the specific ways in which the experience of life on a low income shapes 
one’s decision-making processes, focusing on three different aspects of the socioecological context of poverty. 
As summarised in Figure 1, the ‘psychological shift’ model of decision-making under socioeconomic threat (see 
also Sheehy-Skeffington, 2018, 2019; Sheehy-Skeffington & Haushofer, 2014) outlines how psychological 
processes respond to environmental cues triggered by the experience of resource scarcity, instability, and low 
subjective social status. Used as an organising framework for findings from multiple disciplines on the link 
between low socioeconomic status (SES) and decision-making, this model enables behaviours claimed to be 
suboptimal to be seen as not only understandable, but adaptive in socioecological context (Sheehy-Skeffington, 
2018, 2019; Sheehy-Skeffington & Rea, 2017). It thus sheds light on one of the more subtle mechanisms 
through which widening income disparities might harm the well-being of those at the bottom of society, 
showing how they shape life outcomes not only directly, but also indirectly, through decisions which may end 
up entrenching inequality even further. 
	
Figure	1:	Outline	of	the	‘psychological	shift’	model	of	decision-making	under	socioeconomic	threat.	
The psychological impact of resource scarcity 
Following the financial crisis of 2007-8, austerity-driven cuts in public support and unevenness in economic 
recovery have ensured absolute poverty persists as a core characteristic of economic inequality in the 
industrialised world (see e.g., Barnard, 2018). Thus, the first challenge of being at the bottom of a highly 
unequal society is likely that of making basic ends meet. As one needs money for everything, from putting food 
on the table to travelling to work and socialising with friends, having little money means having few options for 
what one can and cannot do.  
As first highlighted by researchers in public health, a key psychological consequence of being constrained in 
what one can do is low sense of control: a form of appraisal that one is unable to influence one’s life outcomes 
(Lachman & Weaver, 1998; Seeman, 2008). Sense of personal control, often talked about as generalised self-
efficacy (Bandura, 1977, 1997), is an important predictor of positive health behaviours, leading public health 
researchers to posit it as a key psychosocial mediator of the impact of low socioeconomic status (SES) on health 
outcomes (Adler & Rehkopf, 2008; Seeman, 2008).  
But there is more to perceived control than self-efficacy. In order to appreciate how deeply the material context 
shapes decision-making processes, we need to consider not only whether one can carry out a desired 
behaviour, but also whether one’s behaviour will be effective in achieving a desired life outcome. The latter 
appraisal has been referred to as response efficacy or outcome expectations (see Skinner, 1996), and is linked 
to locus of control (Rotter, 1966). If one attends a school with very poor teaching and no science facilities, no 
amount of self-efficacy in terms of sitting down to study will enable one to qualify to study medicine, as one’s 
educational outcome is not determined primarily by one’s education-related behaviours. Indeed, there is 
evidence that perceiving one has more control than one actually does, that is, overestimating one’s response 
efficacy, can have negative health and performance consequences (Thompson, Cheek, & Grahma, 1988; see also 
Pittman & Pittman, 1979). Thus, the relatively low sense of control reported by those low in SES may be 
understood as a rational reappraisal of one’s ability to effect life changes in response to real constraints. To the 
extent that rising economic inequality makes the life outcomes of the most successful in society seem ever 
further out of reach, it will exacerbate this low sense of control among those struggling to makes ends meet on 
a daily basis.  
The influence of resource scarcity on these kinds of control appraisals has knock on consequences for 
processes of self-regulation. Experiments have demonstrated that exposure to cues of resource scarcity or 
related stress apparently diminishes self-regulation, by increasing the extent to which one will value an 
immediate over a delayed reward (Haushofer & Fehr, 2014; Liu, Fengh, Suo, Lee, & Li, 2012). Linking this form 
of present bias with sense of control, Gillian Pepper and Daniel Nettle (see Pepper & Nettle, 2017; Pepper & 
Nettle, 2014a) highlight the fact that living in deprived contexts often means being exposed to greater risk of 
early death from environmental forces such as violence, hard manual labour, and toxins. According to this 
account, deprivation cues high extrinsic morality risk—the likelihood that one will die for reasons outside of 
one’s control (see also Nettle, 2010a; Pepper & Nettle, 2014b)—thus, highly impoverished response efficacy.  
This reduces the payoff available from investing energy in long-term outcomes, thus making it more adaptive to 
focus this limited energy on the short term (see Nettle, 2010b). This shift in energy investment is core to 
understanding what Pepper and Nettle call the ‘behavioural constellation of deprivation’—that set of 
behaviours associated with low socioeconomic groups which seem to harm their long-term outcomes—casting 
them as responses to ecological cues, which are adaptive in an ultimate sense (Pepper & Nettle, 2017). In social 
psychological terms, what might appear as irrationally myopic decisions, driven by enduring traits such as 
inability to delay gratification (Mischel, 1974; 2014; Mischel, Shoda, & Rodriguez, 1989) or discounting of 
future rewards (Kirby & Marakovic, 1996) are in fact the product of a rational regulatory shift from the long to 
the short term (see Fujita, 2011), in response to the reality of the experience of poverty. As suggested in Figure 
1, socioeconomic disparities in personal control and long-term focus would thus not be deficiencies of low SES 
groups, but a case of a reappraisal of the actual impact of behaviour on life outcomes, and temporal adjustment 
of priorities as a result. 
Whereas sense of control and short-term focus relate to the domains of self-appraisal and self-regulation, 
respectively, the third set of decision-making mechanisms influenced by resource scarcity sit in the cognitive 
domain. In the field of behavioural economics, Sendhil Mullainathan, Eldar Shafir, and collaborators have 
charted how being short on money is similar to being short on time or any other kind of resource: it is a 
situation of scarcity, which has a predictable cognitive impact on anyone experiencing it. First, scarcity leads 
the mind to ‘tunnel’ on the resource in question, such that a hungry person finds it hard to get food out of mind 
(Keys, Brožek, Henschel, Mickelsen, & Taylor, 1950), just as a poor person finds it hard to keep money out of 
mind (Shah, Zhao, Mullainathan, & Shafir, 2018). Second, such a narrowing of focus is said to take up limited 
‘mental bandwith’, leaving one too cognitively overloaded to focus on other important aspects of decision-
making, and on the downstream consequences of one’s decisions (Mullainathan & Shafir, 2013). Studies in this 
research stream have shown how middle income participants, when given temporary exposure to the 
experience of resource scarcity in an online game, behave in similar ways to those actually experiencing 
poverty, borrowing resources from future rounds to the detriment of later game outcomes (Shah, Mullainathan, 
& Shafir, 2012). The claim is that here, short-termism is caused not by regulatory adjustment, but by mental 
disruption—disruption which prevents one from engaging the core cognitive processes of executive 
functioning, and even leads one to perform worse in intelligence tests than when one is not preoccupied with 
financial concerns (Mani, Mullainathan, Shafir, & Zhao, 2013).  
Such behavioural economics research contributes to a picture of seemingly suboptimal behaviours as the 
product of the damaging cognitive impact of resource scarcity and the pressures that brings. What is less fully 
articulated from this perspective is how such responses might not only be understandable, but optimal and 
rational, when considered in context, just as shifts in personal control and self-regulation are adaptive 
responses to difficult ecological conditions. Rather than assume the impact of resource scarcity is a case of 
cognitive disruption, one could look at the specific nature of cognitive processing under conditions of scarcity 
to see whether it, too, might involve an adaptive shifting of focus (Sheehy-Skeffington & Rea, 2017; see also 
Frankenhuis & de Weerth, 2013). With Michael Price, Nicholas Pound and Isabel Scott, I have started looking at 
this in the case of food scarcity (Sheehy-Skeffington, Price, Scott, & Pound, 2019). We administered cognitive 
tests to participants who had been fasting for 12 hours, half of whom were randomly assigned to eat breakfast 
(the other half remaining hungry). Preliminary results using this experimental design suggest that the 
established finding of a damaging effect of hunger on cognitive performance goes away, and possibly flips in 
direction, when participants are engaged in cognitive tasks involving food stimuli. This implies that cognitive 
resources have not been disrupted or depleted by the experience of resource scarcity, but have shifted in focus 
toward addressing the pressing need (see also Kurzban, Duckworth, Kable, & Myers, 2013). They thus 
contribute to the emerging picture of the experience of low socioeconomic status inducing a ‘psychological 
shift’ in response to socioecological cues.  
The psychological impact of instability 
Living in poverty is more than just living in need. Invariably, it also involves living in an unstable situation, in 
which there are frequent changes in circumstances such as one’s earnings, whether one will have enough food 
for one’s family, and perhaps even where one sleeps. Instability is recognised as a key component of life in low 
income contexts (Gad & Johnson, 1980; Evans, 2004), and its importance is enhanced in more unequal societies, 
where the lowest paid jobs are increasingly precarious in terms of guaranteed hours and income (Standing, 
2011). The question then arises as to whether the instability brought about by relative poverty leads to the 
same pattern of shifts in the three psychological processes outlined above as does scarcity. Certainly, we know 
from classic studies on control deprivation (e.g., Pittman & Pittman, 1979) that being unable to predict the 
impact of one’s actions in a game triggers a low sense of control. Economists have recently shown how 
economic instability, defined as unavoidable downside risks such as a sudden loss of income, can lead to 
increases in obesity in affected families, controlling for overall income (Kong, Osberg, & Zhou, 2018; Rohde, 
Tang, Osberg, & Rao, 2017; Watson, Osberg, & Phipps, 2016; see also Claassen, Corneille & Klein, Chapter XX). 
Given the central role of control in enabling healthy behaviours (Davis et al., 2007; Fisher et al., 2011), it is 
possible that the impact of this form of financial instability on health outcomes is mediated by shifts in 
psychological processes affecting decision-making. That is, the experience, or anticipation, of an unpredictable 
loss of income may decrease one’s sense of control, and with it, one’s long-term focus, and this psychological 
shift may be what drives up unhealthy eating behaviours.  
Moving from control appraisal to self-regulation, an emerging strand of evolutionary developmental research 
looking at the impact of adverse conditions in childhood on later life decision-making gives a prominent role to 
instability as an ecological cue. Researchers in this tradition adopt the biological perspective of the life history 
theory, which posits that humans, as with other animals, draw on cues concerning the difficulty of their 
environmental conditions while they are very young (used as a predictor for conditions later), in developing 
cognitive and regulatory strategies (Ellis, Figueredo, Brumbach, & Schlomer, 2009; Roff, 1992; Stearns, 1992). 
Studies in this vein have shown how those who grow up in environments that are harsh and unpredictable are 
more likely, when presented with an experimental treatment that increases their current sense of economic 
threat (assumed to mimic this childhood environment), to behave more impulsively (Griskevicius et al., 2013; 
though see Pepper et al., 2017). This shift in focus is the central feature of adopting a ‘fast’ life history 
strategy—a behavioural repertoire claimed to be seen across animal species, in which organisms invest their 
limited energy in achieving early gains to inclusive fitness, usually through having many offspring when young, 
as opposed to investing more in fewer offspring over a longer lifespan. Present-biased behaviours in adulthood, 
seen from this perspective, are not failures of an innate ability to resist impulses, but signatures of an overall 
regulatory shift toward the present that is an adaptive response to extreme ecological conditions.  
Insights on the regulatory impact of exposure to unpredictability when young are in line with emerging studies 
of unpredictability experienced in adulthood. This work has again challenged a purely trait-based notion of 
willpower, as inferred from the classic studies of Walter Mischel, in which academic and other outcomes are 
predicted by whether a person, when young, could resist the impulse of eating one marshmallow in order to 
receive the reward of a second marshmallow at an unspecified later time (see Mischel, 1974, 2014). Celeste 
Kidd and collaborators (Kidd, Palmieri, & Aslin, 2013) created a variation of the marshmallow task in which 
children were assigned, first, to learn that the environment they were in was either stable (and thus, reliable) 
or unstable (and thus, unreliable). Those in the reliable condition waited almost four times as long, on average, 
as those in the unreliable condition, without eating the tempting marshmallow (Kidd et al., 2013). This result 
implies that a perceived failure of impulse control, as observed in lower income children from Mischel’s studies, 
might in fact be the product of an implicit decision to prioritise a short-term over long-term reward (see also 
Fujita, 2011), in a manner that is rationally responsive to the instability, and thus unpredictability, of the 
surrounding context (see also Daly & Wilson, 2005; Pepper & Nettle, 2017; Wilson & Daly, 2004). 
In the case of cognitive functioning, the impact of early life instability is also moving toward recognition of the 
adaptiveness of the behavioural responses exhibited by those from deprived contexts. Bruce Ellis, Willem 
Frankenhuis, and others (Ellis, Bianchi, Griskevicius, & Frankenhuis, 2017; see also Frankenhuis & De Weerth, 
2013; Frankenhuis, Panchanathan, & Nettle, 2016) have put forward a model of resilience based on life history 
theory principles, which focuses on the cognitive strengths exhibited by those who have grown up in adverse 
contexts, the latter defined as involving hardship and unpredictability. Complementing the established body of 
work on the damaging cognitive impact of childhood deprivation (Bradley & Corwyn, 2002; Conger & Donellan, 
2007; Duncan, Magnuson, Kalil, & Ziol-Guest, 2012), this work explores its adaptive impact. It begins by 
considering which cognitive skills are most needed in situations of harshness or unpredictability, and thus 
might be stronger among those who have grown up in such situations, than in those from less stressful 
backgrounds (see Ellis et al., 2017). In the case of those growing up in instability, one set of studies found that 
people with such a background (as compared to those with no exposure to childhood instability) who were  
presented with information regarding economic uncertainty exhibited worse performance on measures of the 
executive function of inhibitory control (related to impulsivity, and thus in line with the above findings), but 
better performance on measures of cognitive flexibility (specifically, shifting – see Mittal, Griskevicius, Simpson, 
Sung, & Young, 2015; see also Vandenbroucke et al., 2015). Another set of studies looked at different facets of 
working memory, finding that those who grew up in unpredictable environments, when primed with 
uncertainty, had worse working memory capacity and retrieval, but better working memory updating, 
compared to those who grew up in predictable environments (Young, Griskevicius, Simpson, Waters, & Mittal, 
2018). 
In sum, there is evidence to support the claim that the instability that is increasingly a feature of life at the 
bottom of unequal societies, and the resultant unpredictability of life circumstances, influences psychological 
processes in a similar manner to resource scarcity. Experiencing unpredictable change, whether in income, 
employment, working hours, living conditions, school, or relationships, especially in a critical period of youth, 
seems to lead to the development of regulatory and cognitive strategies which can be triggered by situations of 
uncertainty later in life, and are possibly well adapted to such situations, even if they have damaging long-term 
outcomes. Though not studied directly, these shifts are likely mediated by an implicit or explicit sense that an 
unpredictable world is one over which one has little control, and thus which requires a different set of 
psychological responses than would a world full of people and events on which one can reliably depend.  
The psychological impact of low subjective social status 
Looking at the psychological impact of scarcity and instability goes some way to situating the observation of 
suboptimal behaviours associated with low income groups in the wider context of material needs and 
ecological constraints (see also Üskül & Oishi, 2018). The truly social nature of this wider context becomes 
clear, however, in the case of my proposed third key component of the psychological situation of poverty: that 
of low subjective social status (see Sheehy-Skeffington & Haushofer, 2014; Sheehy-Skeffington, 2016; 2018, 
2019). In a rich society, poverty is not just having little, but having less than others, and the more unequal the 
society, the more salient relative comparisons become (Cheung & Lucas, 2016). To the extent that being poor 
means feeling low in a society’s hierarchy, the salience of feeling poor will increase as the hierarchy becomes 
ever more steep (see also Wilkinson & Pickett, 2009). 
An analysis of socioeconomic status in terms of relative standing is a central perspective in the cultural 
psychology of social class. In this strand of research, Michael Kraus and collaborators (Kraus, Piff, & Keltner, 
2011; Kraus, Tan & Tannenbaum, 2013) have characterised the experience of low social class in terms of the 
perception that one is relatively low on the ‘ladder of society’ (see Adler, Epel, Castellazzo, & Ickovics, 2000; 
Goodman et al., 2001). Given the centrality of perceptions of social rank in human and primate evolutionary 
history (Cummins, 2005; Sapolsky, 2004), it is no surprise that humans are very sensitive to where they sit in 
social hierarchies, and adjust their perceptual, regulatory and cognitive processes as a result (Anderson, 
Hildreth, & Howland, 2015; Keltner, Gruenfeld, & Anderson, 2003; see also Scheepers & Ellemers, Chapter XX). 
The question then turns to whether the decision-making processes associated with life in low income contexts 
can be understood in part as responsive, and perhaps even adaptive, to the context of low subjective social 
status. 
The answer is straightforward when it comes to sense of control. Consistent with the fact that being low in any 
hierarchy is synonymous to having little relative power (Magee & Galinsky, 2008), being low in the 
socioeconomic hierarchy is reliably linked to self-reporting low levels of power and control over one’s life 
outcomes (Bobak, Pikhart, Rose, Hertzman, & Marmot, 2000; Keltner et al., 2003; Piff, Kraus, Côté, Cheng, & 
Keltner, 2010). Indeed, this feeling of low relative power is critically adaptive for any animal who finds him or 
herself at the bottom of a dominance hierarchy, in that it enables the avoidance of costly fights (e.g., Dawkins, 
1976). Against the possibility that the link between SES and sense of control is due solely to low self-efficacy (or 
related traits) limiting socioeconomic achievement, experiments have demonstrated that exposure to 
perceptions that one is relatively low in SES (regardless of one’s actual income) decreases sense of control, an 
effect that is mediated by lower self-reported power and dominance (Sheehy-Skeffington & Sidanius, 2015).  
Moving from appraisal to regulatory processes, the literature on the psychology of social power leads us to 
expect that the lower perceived rank that comes with the salience of relative poverty should decrease approach 
orientation and increase inhibition orientation, thereby making one more focused on threats and neglectful of 
rewards and goals (see Keltner et al., 2003). Indeed, a systematic review of recent studies on poverty and 
decision-making processes revealed a positive association between socioeconomic status and the adoption of a 
mindset conducive to long-term goal completion, as measured through aspirations and motivation to achieve in 
a number of domains (Sheehy-Skeffington & Rea, 2017). When it comes to the privileging of short-term over 
long-term goals, to the extent that this is a rational response to low control (see above), it should become more 
likely as low relative income is made salient. Though the link between subjective socioeconomic status and 
present-bias has not been tested directly, there is some evidence that feeling low in a social hierarchy increases 
discounting of the future (Joshi & Fast, 2013; though see Zhang & Smith, 2018).  
Turning to the cognitive domain, I have recently used an experimental approach to explore the relationship 
between low subjective socioeconomic status and executive functioning. Inspired by separate observations of 
the negative cognitive impact of resource scarcity (Mani et al., 2013) and low sense of power (Smith, Jostmann, 
Galinsky, & Van Dijk, 2008), I set out to test whether the perception of low relative socioeconomic status could 
disrupt executive functioning. In three studies run with diverse samples, Jim Sidanius and I found that it did: 
those randomly assigned to believe that they were relatively low on the societal socioeconomic ladder 
performed worse than those believing they were relatively high in SES on measures of inhibitory control, 
planning, and updating. A fourth study implied this impaired cognitive functioning damaged performance in a 
financial decision-making task (Sheehy-Skeffington & Sidanius, 2014).  
More recent work digs deeper, asking whether this is indeed a case of cognitive deficit, or, rather, as implied by 
the current model, sign of a shift in cognitive resources toward addressing a pressing need. Michael Price and I 
designed a study in which we varied perceptions of relative socioeconomic standing, and also the perceived 
relevance of the cognitive tasks that followed, the latter by presenting information on the real world correlates 
of executive functioning performance. Results suggest that as long as cognitive tasks are presented in standard, 
status-irrelevant ways (i.e. by linking executive functioning and prefrontal brain activity), they elicit worse 
performance from those feeling relatively socioeconomically deprived, as I had previously found. Once the 
cognitive task is presented as relevant to potential status gains (by linking executive functioning and later 
socioeconomic achievement), however, this performance difference across the subjective SES conditions seems 
to go away, and may even flip in the opposite direction (Sheehy-Skeffington, Sidanius, & Price, 2016). As with 
the above work on the cognitive impact of resource scarcity (Sheehy-Skeffington et al., 2019), this set of 
findings implies that threats associated with low SES, in this case concerning status, lead to a shift in focus of 
cognitive processes, as opposed to a form of mental ‘shut down’ induced by cognitive load.  
Research taking this more nuanced perspective on the psychological impact of low subjective social status can 
also shed light on more general observations of seemingly suboptimal behaviours associated with those living 
in or near poverty, such as spending a significant proportion of one’s income on cigarettes, illegal activities 
(such as drug-taking or knife-carrying), or conspicuous consumption (Agnew, Matthews, Bucher, Welcher, & 
Keyes, 2008; Banerjee & Duflo, 2007; Sidanius & Pratto, 1999). Rather than dismiss such behavioural patterns 
as the product of either deficient decision-making abilities, or even contextually-disrupted decision-making 
processes, they might be understood as resulting from a shift in psychological focus toward addressing a threat 
arising from the socioecological context—in this case, a threat to social status. To the extent that inequality 
increases the association between poverty and low subjective status, spending to serve status goals in local 
contexts is an ecologically rational decision, regardless of its damaging long-term consequences. Social and 
consumer psychology research has shown that consumption and display of status goods increases as low status 
is made salient, supportive of this rational compensatory account (Carr & Vignoles, 2011; Rucker & Galinsky, 
2008; 2009; Sivanathan & Pettit, 2010; Walasek & Brown, Chapter XX; though see Karlsson, Gärling, Dellgran, & 
Klingander, 2005; Zhao, Jin, Song, Cui, & Ding, 2018).   
Summary and outstanding questions: Socioeconomic threat as a trigger of psychological shifts 
Returning to Figure 1, the model presented here proposes the three most psychologically salient aspects of 
being poor in a rich, unequal country, and the ways in which they may trigger shifts in psychological processes 
in three key domains. This framework (see also Sheehy-Skeffington & Haushofer, 2014; Sheehy-Skeffington, 
2018, 2019; Sheehy-Skeffington & Rea, 2017) attempts to take the perspective of those experiencing poverty in 
both an absolute and a relative sense, by considering the ways environmental constraints change one’s 
decision-making context. I suggest they do so by creating a psychological situation involving the salience of (1) 
the scarcity of much-needed resources, (2) the instability of resource supply and consequent unpredictability 
of life circumstances, and (3) the position of being very low in the status hierarchy of one’s society. These 
contextual cues are socioecological in nature (see Üskül & Oishi, 2018), and are experienced as a set of threats 
that need to be immediately addressed. I argue that they trigger a shift in psychological processes to address 
these threats, in a way that optimises the use of limited energy reserves in the moment, and, possibly, across 
the lifespan. First, one’s appraisal of the extent to which one can control one’s life outcomes is lowered. Second, 
and linked to this diminished sense of control, one’s regulatory focus shifts from long-term to short-term goals, 
and from rewards to threats. Third, one’s cognitive resources become focused on processes (such as shifting), 
tasks (such as those linked to potential status gains), and stimuli (such as money and food) that address 
pressing needs. 	
These shifts in psychological processes go at least some way toward explaining what at first seem to be 
damaging decision-making patterns associated with those living at the bottom of unequal societies. By 
understanding their mechanistic underpinnings and proximal goals, we can appreciate the functional and 
adaptive and nature of many of these decisions. The result will be an understanding of decision-making under 
socioeconomic threat which does justice to the resilience and resourcefulness of those in or close to poverty. 
Such an understanding is needed now more than ever, as a growing economic distance between the social 
classes brings with it a growing psychological distance. Indeed, the association between increases in income 
inequality and decreases in societal solidarity (Paskov & Dewilde, 2012) may in part be due to the way in which 
inequality creates a divergence in experiences and behaviours across the socioeconomic gradient. Bridge this 
socioeconomic empathy gap may thus help engender support for interventions at multiple levels (Sheehy-
Skeffington & Rea, 2017; see also Ellis et al., 2017). Such interventions might include increasing the actual 
control people have over their life outcomes, strengthening the social safety net in a way that increases the 
predictability of life at the bottom of society, and making academic tasks more relevant to the threats faced by 
students from relatively deprived neighbourhoods. More broadly, this approach adds further weight to calls to 
reduce both poverty and inequality, and to consider each in light of the other. 
There are a number of questions which need to be addressed in developing this into a comprehensive account 
of decision-making under socioeconomic threat. One concerns the relative importance of the three components 
of the psychological situation of poverty, and how this might change over ontogenetic and historical time. Life 
history theory leads us to expect that cues of scarcity and instability have the greatest impact on regulatory 
strategies when experienced at birth and early childhood (Ellis et al., 2009), while developmental psychology 
research highlights the importance of status concerns in adolescence and early adulthood (Brown & Lohr, 
1987; Goodman et al., 2001). The importance of scarcity, at least in terms of basics such as food and shelter, 
likely decreases as a country’s level of economic development increases (Ravallion, 2001), though one would 
expect important cross-nation differences in this relationship depending on the strength of social protections 
for those at the bottom of society—the safety net which we know is endangered by increasing inequality 
(Paskov & Dewilde, 2012). Such social protections, when they take the form of a guaranteed income, housing or 
healthcare, likely reduce the salience of instability among low income populations, but compete against a trend 
toward casualization in low-paid work (Standing, 2011), entailing unpredictable incomes, which will increase 
instability for those at the bottom.  
When it comes to status concerns, there is reason to believe that the salience of relative socioeconomic 
standing varies with over-time and cross-national differences in economic inequality, the central theme of this 
volume (see Cheung & Lucas, 2016). In building up an empirical case for the impact of inequality on status-
related concerns (see Wilkinson & Pickett, 2017, 2018), it will be important to demonstrate changes not only 
across countries, but over time, including checking whether decreases in inequality are followed by a reduction 
in status anxiety (see Vilhjalmsdottir, De Clercq, Gardarsdottir, Bernburg, & Sigfusdottir, 2018). It is also critical 
to clarify the level at which inequality is proposed to have its greatest impact, which, when focusing on status 
anxiety as a mediating mechanism, should depend on the most salient reference group for socioeconomic 
comparisons. Wilkinson and Pickett (2009) claim state- or nation- level inequality are more socially corrosive 
than inequality at the neighbourhood-level, while at the same time drawing on theories of evolved sensitivity to 
status hierarchies (e.g., Sapolsky, 2004) that are rooted in local comparisons. Research on income, inequality, 
and subjective well-being seems to lean toward the importance of the local level of comparison (Anderson, 
Kraus, Galinsky, Keltner, 2012; Kudrna, 2018; Senik, 2009; Sheehy-Skeffington, Kteily, & Hauser, 2016). 
However, associations between income and satisfaction have been observed when comparisons are made at 
multiple levels, including with the previous generation in one’s family (Dolan & Lordan, 2013; Hadjar & Samuel, 
2015), one’s neighbours (Luttmer, 2005), one’s colleagues (Anderson et al., 2012; Card, Mas, Moretti, Saez, 
2012; Clark & Senik, 2010), one’s occupational group (Bygren, 2004; Dornstein, 1988), one’s peers (Anderson 
et al., 2012; Callan, Kim, & Matthews, 2015; Kudrna, 2018; Pérez-Asenjo, 2011), and society at large (Kurdna, 
2018; Sheehy-Skeffington et al., 2016a). 
Another unresolved issue concerns the interrelationships between the appraisal, regulatory and cognitive 
processes proposed to shift in response to the psychological situation of poverty. The above model includes an 
arrow to represent the influence of control appraisals on self-regulation, but it is possible that cognitive 
processes are also affecting, and/or affected by appraisal and regulatory processes. One intriguing possibility is 
that the psychological shifts are part of a more global alteration in information-processing style, such as 
construal level—the extent to which one is processing information abstractly (focusing, for example, on why	
certain behaviours are being performed) or concretely (focusing on how behaviours are performed; see 
Vallacher & Wegner, 1987). According to construal level theory, one engages in concrete (or low construal) 
information processing when focused on stimuli that are proximal on four correlated dimensions of 
psychological distance: the temporal, the spatial, the social, and the existential (Trope & Liberman, 2010). 
Sheehy-Skeffington and Haushofer (2014; see also Sheehy-Skeffington, 2019) bring this social psychology 
theory to the study of poverty and decision-making, suggesting the possibility that poverty might lead to a 
lowering of construal level and a resultant constriction of focus toward the ‘here and now’. Integrating this idea 
into the above model would imply that resource scarcity, instability, and low social status trigger a shift in focus 
not only toward the present (and away from the future), but also toward the local (and away from the distant), 
toward those socially close (and away from those socially distant), and toward the actual (and away from the 
hypothetical). In their review of recent evidence on poverty and decision-making processes, Sheehy-
Skeffington and Rea (2017) found the notion of shifts in psychological distance to account well for the impact of 
poverty not only on cognition and self-regulation, but also on social interaction. The framework of construal 
level and psychological distance offers a unifying language with which to articulate the functionality of 
behaviours in a proximal sense, alongside their possibly harmful distal impact (Sheehy-Skeffington & Rea, 
2017). Studies in my lab are currently testing the proposed link between low SES and psychological distance 
directly, to assess the viability of this claim (see, e.g., Sheehy-Skeffington, Price, Havmose, Scott, & Pound, 
2017). 
Finally, although a consideration of subjective status goes some way toward highlighting the role of social 
psychological processes in mediating the experience of poverty, there is more to be done to situate poverty in 
its wider societal context. For example, the importance of nation-level inequality for decision-making and life 
outcomes entails consideration of how low socioeconomic status is experienced not as an interpersonal, but as 
an intergroup phenomenon (see Croizet & Claire, 1998; Easterbrook, Hadden, & Nieuwenhuis, chapter xx; 
Manstead, 2018). Developing a more nuanced understanding of the underlying mechanisms of behaviour in 
unequal contexts should also proceed alongside consideration of how individual psychological processes are 
coloured by cultural understandings of the self, which vary with social class as well as across countries (see 
Stephens & Townsend, 2013).  
Conclusion 
Concerns about economic inequality are often pitched in opposition to concerns about poverty. Social 
commentators (e.g., Bourne & Snowdon, 2016; see Bucelli, 2017) have argued that instead of trying to regulate 
the spread of income or wealth across the socioeconomic spectrum, we should instead be worried only about 
helping those at the bottom. From a social psychological perspective, however, one cannot understand poverty 
without considering it in the context of inequality. Supported by an overview of emerging research on the 
psychological consequences of low socioeconomic status, this chapter has proposed a framework for 
understanding decision-making in contexts of relative poverty in terms of rational psychological responses to 
socioecological cues. To the extent that inequality exacerbates the salience of such cues, it will increase the 
incidence of decisions which may make sense in the context of poverty, but are ill-fitted for a society 
increasingly alienated from its own poor. Just as efforts to tackle poverty cannot omit the impact of inequality, 
so efforts to reduce inequality must come hand-in-hand with an understanding of the perspectives of those 
suffering its worst consequences. 
References  
Adler, N. E., Epel, E. S., Castellazzo, G., & Ickovics, J. R. (2000). Relationship of subjective and objective social 
class with psychological functioning: Preliminary data in healthy White women. Health	Psychology,	19, 
586– 592. 
Adler, N. E. and Rehkopf, D. H. (2008). U.S. disparities in health: descriptions, causes, and mechanisms. Annual	
Review	of	Public	Health,	29, 235–252.   
Agnew, R., Matthews, S. K., Bucher, J., Welcher, A. N., & Keyes, C. (2008). Socioeconomic status, economic 
problems, and delinquency. Youth	&	Society,	40(2), 159-181. 
Anderson, C., Hildreth, J. A. D., & Howland, L. (2015). Is the desire for status a fundamental human motive? A 
review of the empirical literature. Psychological	Bulletin, 141(3), 574. 
Anderson, C., Kraus, M. W., Galinsky, A. D., & Keltner, D. (2012). The local-ladder effect: Social status and 
subjective well-being. Psychological	Science,	23(7), 764-771. 
Bandura, A. (1977). Self-efficacy: Toward a unified theory of behavioural change. Psychological	Review,	84, 191-
215. 
Bandura, A. (1997). Self-efficacy	in	changing	societies.	Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Banerjee, A., & Duflo, E. (2007). The economic lives of the poor.	Journal	of	Economic	Perspectives,	21, 141–167. 
Barnard, H. (2018). UK Poverty 2018. York: Joseph Rowntree Foundation. Retrieved from: 
https://www.jrf.org.uk/report/uk-poverty-2018Belsky, J., Schlomer, G. L., & Ellis, B. J. (2012). Beyond 
cumulative risk: Distinguishing harshness and unpredictability as determinants of parenting and early 
life history strategy. Developmental	Psychology, 48, 662–673. doi: 10.1037/ a0024454 
Bertrand, M., Mullainathan, S., & Shafir, E. (2004). A behavioural economics view of poverty. American	Economic	
Review,	94(2), 419–23. 
Bobak, M., Pikhart, H., Rose, R., Hertzman, C., & Marmot, M. (2000). Socioeconomic factors, material inequalities, 
and perceived control in self-rated health:Ccross sectional data from seven post-communist countries. 
Social Science	&	Medicine,	51, 343-350. doi: 10.1016/S0277-9536(00)00096-4 
Bourne, R., & Snowdon, C. (2016). Never	mind	the	gap:	Why	we	shouldn’t	worry	about	inequality. IEA Discussion 
Paper No. 70. Retrieved from: https://iea.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2016/09/Never-Mind-the-Gap-
Why-we-shouldnt-worry-about-inequality-1.pdf 
Bradley, R. H., & Corwyn, R. F. (2002). Socioeconomic status and child development. Annual	Review	of	
Psychology,	53, 371–399. doi:10.1146/annurev.psych.53.100901.135233. 
Brown, B. B., & Lohr, M. J. (1987). Peer-group affiliation and adolescent self-esteem: An integration of ego-
identity and symbolic-interaction theories. Journal	of	Personality	and	Social	Psychology,	52(1), 47. 
Bucelli, I. (2017). Inequality,	poverty	and	the	grounds	of	our	normative	concerns. Centre for Analysis of Social 
Exclusion Working Paper 204, London School of Economics and Political Science. Retrieved from: 
http://sticerd.lse.ac.uk/dps/case/cp/casepaper204.pdf 
Bullock, H. E., Fraser Wyche, K. and Williams, W. R. (2001). Media images of the poor. Journal	of	Social	Issues,	
57(2), pp. 229–46. 
Bullock, H. E., Williams, W. R. and Limbert, W. M. (2003). Predicting support for welfare policies: the impact of 
attributions and beliefs about inequality.	Journal	of	Poverty,	7(3), pp. 35–56 
Bygren, M. (2004). Pay reference standards and pay satisfaction: what do workers evaluate their pay against?. 
Social	Science	Research,	33(2), 206-224. 
Callan, M. J., Kim, H., & Matthews, W. J. (2015). Predicting self-rated mental and physical health: The 
contributions of subjective socioeconomic status and personal relative deprivation. Frontiers	in	
psychology, 6(1415),1-14. 
Card, D., Mas, A., Moretti, E., & Saez, E. (2012). Inequality at work: The effect of peer salaries on job 
satisfaction. American	Economic	Review, 102(6), 2981-3003. 
Carr, H. L., & Vignoles, V. L. (2011). Keeping up with the Joneses: Status projection as symbolic self-completion. 
European	Journal	of	Social	Psychology,	41(4), 518-527. 
Cheung, F., & Lucas, R. E. (2016). Income inequality is associated with stronger social comparison effects: The 
effect of relative income on life satisfaction. Journal	of	Personality	and	Social	Psychology,	110(2), 332. 
Clark, A. E., & Senik, C. (2010). Who compares to whom? The anatomy of income comparisons in Europe. The	
Economic	Journal,	120(544), 573-594. 
Conger, R. D., & Donnellan, M. B. (2007). An interactionist perspective on the socioeconomic context of human 
development. Annual	Review	of	Psychology,	58, 175–199. 
doi:10.1146/annurev.psych.58.110405.085551 
Croizet, J. C., & Claire, T. (1998). Extending the concept of stereotype threat to social class: The intellectual 
underperformance of students from low socioeconomic backgrounds. Personality	and	Social	Psychology	
Bulletin,	24(6), 588-594. 
Cummins, D. (2005). Dominance, Status, and Social Hierarchies. In Buss, D. (Ed)	Handbook	of	Evolutionary	
Psychology. New Jersey: John Wiley & Sons. 
Daly, M., & Wilson, M. (2005). Carpe diem: Adaptation and devaluing the future. The	Quarterly	Review	of	Biology,	
80(1), 55-60. 
Davis, C., Patte, K., Levitan, R., Reid, C., Tweed, S., & Curtis, C. (2007). From motivation to behaviour: a model of 
reward sensitivity, overeating, and food preferences in the risk profile for obesity. Appetite,	48(1), 12-
19. 
Dawkins, R. (1976). Hierarchical organisation: A candidate principle for ethology. In P. P. G. Bateson & R. A. 
Hinde, Eds, 	Growing	Points	in	Ethology. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press. 
Dolan, P., & Lordan, G. (2013). Moving Up and Sliding Down: An Empirical Assessment of the Effect of Social 
Mobility on Subjective Wellbeing’. CEP Discussion Paper dp1190. 
http://ideas.repec.org/p/cep/cepdps/dp1190.html. 
Dornstein, M. (1988). Wage reference groups and their determinants: A study of blue-collar and white-collar 
employees in Israel. Journal	of	Occupational	and	Organizational	Psychology,	61(3), 221-235. 
Duncan, G. J., Magnuson, K., Kalil, A., & Ziol-Guest, K. (2012). The importance of early childhood poverty. Social	
Indicators	Research,	108, 87–98. doi:10.1007/s11205-011-9867-9. 
Ellis, B. J., Bianchi, J., Griskevicius, V., & Frankenhuis, W. E. (2017). Beyond risk and protective factors: An 
adaptation-based approach to resilience. Perspectives	on	Psychological	Science, 12(4), 561-587. 
Ellis B. J., Figueredo, A. J., Brumbach, B. H., & Schlomer, G. L. (2009). Fundamental dimensions of environmental 
risk: the impact of harsh versus unpredictable environments on the evolution and development of life 
history strategies. Human	Nature, 20, 204-268. 
Evans, G. W. (2004). The environment of childhood poverty. American	Psychologist,	59(2), 77. 
Fisher, E. B., Fitzgibbon, M. L., Glasgow, R. E., Haire-Joshu, D., Hayman, L. L., Kaplan, R. M., ... & Ockene, J. K. 
(2011). Behavior matters. American	Journal	of	Preventive	Medicine,	40(5), e15-e30. 
Frankenhuis, W. E., & de Weerth, C. (2013). Does Early-Life Exposure to Stress Shape or Impair Cognition? 
Current	Directions	in	Psychological	Science,	22(5), 407-412. 
Frankenhuis, W. E., Panchanathan, K., & Nettle, D. (2016). Cognition in harsh and unpredictable environments. 
Current	Opinion	in	Psychology, 7, 76–80. doi:10.1016/j.copsyc.2015.08.011 
Fujita, K. (2011). On conceptualizing self-control as more than the effortful inhibition of impulses. Personality	
and	Social	Psychology	Review,	15(4), 352–66. 
Gad, M. T., & Johnson, J. H. (1980). Correlates of adolescent life stress as related to race, SES, and levels of 
perceived social support. Journal	of	Clinical	Child	&	Adolescent	Psychology, 9(1), 13-16. 
Goodman, E., Adler, N. E., Kawachi, I., Frazier, A. L., Huang, B., & Colditz, G. A. (2001). Adolescents’ perceptions of 
social status: Development and evaluation of a new indicator. Pediatrics, 108, 1–8. doi: 
10.1542/peds.108.2.e31 
Griskevicius, V., Ackerman, J. M., Cantú, S. M., Delton, A. W., Robertson, T. E., Simpson, J. A., ... & Tybur, J. M. 
(2013). When the economy falters, do people spend or save? Responses to resource scarcity depend on 
childhood environments. Psychological	Science, 24(2), 197-205. 
Hadjar, A., & Samuel, R. (2015). Does upward social mobility increase life satisfaction? A longitudinal analysis 
using British and Swiss panel data. Research	in	Social	Stratification	and	Mobility, 39, 48-58. 
Haushofer, J., & Fehr, E. (2014). On the psychology of poverty. Science, 344(6186), 862-867. 
Joshi, P. D., & Fast, N. J. (2013). Power and reduced temporal discounting. Psychological	Science, 24(4), 432-438. 
Karlsson, N., Gärling, T., Dellgran, P., & Klingander, B. (2005). Social comparison and consumer behaviour: 
When feeling richer or poorer than others is more important than being so.	Journal	of	Applied	Social	
Psychology,	35(6), 1206–22. 
Keltner, D., Gruenfeld, D. H., & Anderson, C. (2003). Power, approach, and inhibition. Psychological	Review, 
110(2), 265.    
Keys, A., Brožek, J., Henschel, A., Mickelsen, O., & Taylor, H. L. (1950). The	Biology	of	Human	Starvation. 
Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press. 
Kidd, C., Palmeri, H., & Aslin, R. N. (2013). Rational snacking: Young children’s decision-making on the 
marshmallow task is moderated by beliefs about environmental reliability. Cognition, 126(1), 109-114. 
Kirby, K. N., & Marakovic, N. N. (1996). Delay-discounting probabilistic rewards: Rates decrease as amounts 
increase. Psychonomic	Bulletin	&	Review,	3(1), 100-104. 
Kong, N., Osberg, L., & Zhou, W. (2018). The	Shattered	“Iron	Rice	Bowl”—	Intergenerational	Effects	of	Economic	
Insecurity	During	Chinese	State-Owned	Enterprise	Reform, University of Queensland School of Economics 
Discussion Paper Series 595,  http://www.uq.edu.au/economics/abstract/595.pdf 
Kraus, M. W., Piff, P. K., & Keltner, D. (2011). Social class as culture the convergence of resources and rank in the 
social realm. Current	Directions	in	Psychological	Science,	20(4), 246-250. 
Kraus, M. W., Tan, J. J., & Tannenbaum, M. B. (2013). The social ladder: A rank-based perspective on social class. 
Psychological	Inquiry,	24(2), 81-96. doi: 10.1080/1047840X.2013.778803 
Kudrna, L. (2018). An	investigation	of	the	relationships	of	absolute	and	relative	socio-economic	status	with	
subjective	well-being	in	the	United	States	and	England. Unpublished PhD thesis, London School of 
Economics and Political Science. 
Kurzban, R., Duckworth, A., Kable, J. W., & Myers, J. (2013). An opportunity cost model of subjective effort and 
task performance. Behavioral	and	Brain	Sciences, 36(6), 661-679. 
Lachman, M. E., Weaver S. L. (1998). The sense of control as a moderator of social class differences in health 
and well- being. Journal	of	Personality	and	Social	Psychology, 74(3), 763. 
Liu, L., Fengh, T., Suo, T., Lee, K. & Li, H. (2012). Adapting to the destitute Situations: Poverty cues lead to short-
term choice.	PLoS	ONE,	7(4), e33950. 
Luttmer, E. F. (2005). Neighbors as negatives: Relative earnings and well-being. The	Quarterly	Journal	of	
Economics, 120(3), 963-1002. 
MacDonald, R., Shildrick, T. and Furlong, A. (2014) 'Benefits Street' and the myth of workless communities. 
Sociological	Research	Online,	19(3), p. 1 
Magee, J. C., & Galinsky, A. D. (2008). Social hierarchy: The self-reinforcing nature of power and status.	Academy	
of	Management	Annals,	2, 351–398. doi: 10.1080/19416520802211628. 
Mani, A., Mullainathan, S., Shafir, E., & Zhao, J. (2013). Poverty impedes cognitive function. Science,	341(6149), 
976-980. 
Manstead, A. S. (2018). The psychology of social class: How socioeconomic status impacts thought, feelings, and 
behaviour. British	Journal	of	Social	Psychology,	57(2), 267-291. 
McKendrick, J. H., Sinclair, S., Irwin, A., O’Donnell, H., Scott, G. and Dobbie, L. (2008) The	media,	poverty	and	
public	opinion	in	the	UK. York: Joseph Rowntree Foundation. 
Mischel, W., Shoda, Y., & Rodriguez, M. L. (1989). Delay of gratification in children. Science,	244(4907), 933-938. 
doi: 10.1126/science.2658056 
Mischel, W. (1974). Processes in delay of gratification. In L. Berkowitz (Ed.), Advances	in	experimental	social	
psychology (Vol. 7, pp. 249–292). New York, NY: Academic Press. 
Mischel, W. (2014). The	marshmallow	test:	Why	self-control	is	the	engine	of	success. New York, NY: Little, Brown. 
Mittal, C., Griskevicius, V., Simpson, J. A., Sung, S., & Young, E. S. (2015). Cognitive adaptations to stressful 
environments: when childhood adversity enhances adult executive function. Journal	of	Personality	and	
Social	Psychology,	109(4), 604-621. 
Mullainathan, S., & Shafir, E. (2013). Scarcity:	Why	having	too	little	means	so	much. New York: Macmillan. 
Nettle, D. (2010a). Dying young and living fast: Variation in life history across English neighbourhoods.	
Behavioural	Ecology,	21(2), 387–395. 
Nettle, D. (2010b). Why are there social gradients in preventative health behaviour? A perspective from 
behavioural ecology. (E. Von Elm, Ed.). PLoS	ONE,	5(10), 6. 
Paris, N. (2008, January 08). ‘Tories attack ‘something for nothing’ culture. The	Telegraph. Retrieved from 
https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/uknews/1574927/Tories-attack-something-for-nothing-
culture.html 
Pampel, F. C., Krueger, P. M., & Denney, J. T. (2010). Socioeconomic disparities in health behaviours. Annual	
Review	of	Sociology,	36, 349. 
Paskov, M., & Dewilde, C. (2012). Income inequality and solidarity in Europe. Research	in	Social	Stratification	
and	Mobility,	30(4), 415-432. 
Pepper, G. V., Corby, D. H., Bamber, R., Smith, H., Wong, N., & Nettle, D. (2017). The influence of mortality and 
socioeconomic status on risk and delayed rewards: a replication with British participants. PeerJ, 5, 
e3580. 
Pepper, G. V., & Nettle, D. (2017). The behavioural constellation of deprivation: causes and consequences. 
Behavioral	and	Brain	Sciences, 40. 
Pepper, G. V. and Nettle, D. (2014a). Socioeconomic disparities in health behaviour: an evolutionary 
perspective. In D. W. Lawson and M. Gibson (Eds). Applied	evolutionary	anthropology:	Darwinian	
approaches	to	contemporary	world	issues. New York: Springer-Verlag. 
Pepper, G. V. & Nettle, D. (2014b). Perceived extrinsic mortality risk and health behaviour: Testing a 
behavioural ecological model. Human	Nature,	25(3), 378-392. 
Pérez-Asenjo, E. (2011). If happiness is relative, against whom do we compare ourselves? Implications for 
labour supply. Journal	of	Population	Economics, 24(4), 1411-1442. 
Piff, P. K., Kraus, M. W., Côté, S., Cheng, B. H., & Keltner, D. (2010). Having less, giving more: The influence of 
social class on prosocial behavior. Journal	of	Personality	and	Social	Psychology, 99(5), 771. 
Pittman, N. L., & Pittman, T. S. (1979). Effects of amount of helplessness training and internal–external locus of 
control on mood and performance. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 37(1), 39. 
Ravallion, M. (2001). Growth, inequality and poverty: Looking beyond averages. World	Development,	29(11), 
1803-1815. 
Ready, D. D. (2010). Socioeconomic disadvantage, school attendance, and early cognitive development: The 
differential effects of school exposure. Sociology	of	Education,	83(4), 271-286. 
Reardon, S. F. (2013). The widening income achievement gap. Educational	Leadership,	70(8), 10-16. 
Roff, D. (1992). Evolution	of	life	histories:	Theory	and	analysis. New York, NY: Routledge. 
Rohde, N., Tang, K. K., Osberg, L., & Rao, D. P. (2017). Is it vulnerability or economic insecurity that matters for 
health?. Journal	of	Economic	Behavior	&	Organization,	134, 307-319. 
Rotter, J. B. (1966). Generalised expectancies for internal versus external control of reinforcement. Journal	of	
Educational	Research,	74, 3, 185-190. 
Rucker, D. D., & Galinsky, A. D. (2008). Desire to acquire: Powerlessness and compensatory consumption. 
Journal	of	Consumer	Research,	35, 257–267. 
Rucker, D. D., & Galinsky, A. D. (2009). Conspicuous consumption versus utilitarian ideals: How different levels 
of power shape consumer behaviour. Journal	of	Experimental	Social	Psychology,	45(3), 549-555. 
Sapolsky, R. M. (2004). Social status and health in humans and other animals. Annual	Review	of	Anthropology,	
33, 393–418. 
Seeman, M. (2008). Personal control. MacArthur	Research	Network	on	SES	&	Health	Psychosocial	Notebook. 
Downloaded from: http://www.macses.ucsf.edu/research/psychosocial/control.php 
Senik, C. (2009). Direct evidence on income comparisons and their welfare effects. Journal	of	Economic	Behavior	
&	Organization,	72(1), 408-424. 
Shah, A. K., Mullainathan, S. and Shafir, E. (2012). Some consequences of having too little. Science,	338(6107), 
682–685. 
Shah, A. K., Zhao, J., Mullainathan, S., & Shafir, E. (2018). Money in the mental lives of the poor. Social	Cognition,	
36(1), 4-19. 
Sheehy-Skeffington, J. (2016). At the Bottom of the Hierarchy: Low subjective socioeconomic status impairs 
sense of control and executive functioning, with implications for health-related and financial decision-
making. Paper presented at the European Human Behaviour & Evolution Association Conference, 
London, UK. 
Sheehy-Skeffington, J. (2018). Decision-making up against the wall: A framework for understanding the 
behavioural dimension of low socioeconomic status. In A. Üskül & S. Oishi (Eds), Socioeconomic	
Environment	and	Human	Psychology:	Social,	Ecological,	and	Cultural	Perspectives. Oxford: Oxford 
University Press. 
Sheehy-Skeffington, J., & Haushofer, J. (2014). Decision-making barriers and opportunities. In Barriers and	
Opportunities	at	the	Base	of	the	Pyramid:	The	Role	of	the	Private	Sector	in	Inclusive	Development. 
Istanbul: UNDP Istanbul International Center for Private Sector in Development. 
Sheehy-Skeffington, J., Kteily, N., & Hauser, O. (2016). Antecedents	and	Consequences	of	Perceptions	of	Economic	
Inequality. Tobin Conference on Inequality and Decision-Making Discussion Paper. 
Sheehy-Skeffington, J., Price, M., Havmose, P., Scott, I., & Pound, N. (2017). Exploring	the	cognitive	impact	of	poor	
socioeconomic	conditions:	A	case	of	deficit	or	of	psychological	shift? Paper presented at the 18th General 
Meeting of the European Association of Social Psychology, Granada, Spain. 
Sheehy-Skeffington, J., Price, M., Scott, I., & Pound, N. (2019). Hunger	and	cognitive	functioning:	A	case	of	
ecological	tuning. Manuscript in preparation. 
Sheehy-Skeffington, J., & Rea, J. (2017). How	Poverty	Affects	People's	Decision-making	Processes. York: Joseph 
Rowntree Foundation. 
Sheehy-Skeffington, J., & Sidanius, J. (2014).	Distracted	looking	up:	Priming	low	socioeconomic	status	impairs	
executive	functions. Paper presented at the 17th General Meeting of the European Association of Social 
Psychology, Amsterdam, The Netherlands. 
Sheehy-Skeffington, J. & Sidanius, J. (2015). Out	of	my	hands:	Low	socioeconomic	status	diminishes	personal	sense	
of	control. Paper presented at the British Psychological Society Developmental Section & Social Section 
Annual Conference, Manchester, UK. 
Sheehy-Skeffington, J., Sidanius, J., & Price, M. E. (2016). Decision-making at the bottom of the hierarchy: The 
cognitive impact of perceiving oneself as low in socioeconomic status. In Flash-talk	delivered	to	the	
Society	of	Personality	and	Social	Psychology	Pre-Conference	on	the	Emerging	Psychology	of	Social	Class,	
San	Diego,	CA. 
Sidanius, J., & Pratto, F. (1999). Social	dominance:	An	intergroup	theory	of	social	hierarchy	and	oppression. New 
York: Cambridge University Press. 
Sivanathan, N., & Pettit, N. C. (2010). Protecting the self through consumption: Status goods as affirmational 
commodities.	Journal	of	Experimental	Social	Psychology,	46(3), 564-570. 
Skinner, E. A. (1996) A guide to constructs of control. Journal	of	Personality	and	Social	Psychology,	71,	549-570. 
Smith, P. K., Jostmann, N. B., Galinsky, A. D., & Van Dijk, W. W. (2008). Lacking power impairs executive 
functions. Psychological	Science,	19(5), 441-447. 
Standing, G. (2011). The Precariat: The dangerous new class. Bloomsbury	Academic. 
Stearns, S. C. (1992). The	evolution	of	life	histories. Oxford, England: Oxford University Press. 
Stephens, N. M., & Townsend, S. S. (2013). Rank is not enough: Why we need a sociocultural perspective to 
understand social class. Psychological	Inquiry, 24(2), 126-130. 
Stringhini, S., Sabia, S., Shipley, M., Brunner, E., Nabi, H., Kivimaki, M. and Singh-Manoux, A. (2010). Association 
of socioeconomic position with health behaviors and mortality. Journal	of	the	American	Medical	
Association, 303(12), pp. 1159–66. 
Thompson S. C., Cheek P. R., Grahma M. A. (1988). The	other	side	of	perceived	control:	Disadvantages	and	
negative	effects. In S. Spacopan, S. Oshamp (Eds). The	Social	Psychology	of	Health. Beverly Hills, CA: Sage, 
pp. 69-93. 
Trope, Y., & Liberman, N. (2010). Construal-level theory of psychological distance. Psychological	Review,	117(2), 
440. 
Üskül, A. K., & Oishi, S. (Eds.). (2018). Socio-Economic	Environment	and	Human	Psychology:	Social,	Ecological,	
and	Cultural	Perspectives. Oxford University Press. 
Vallacher, R. R., & Wegner, D. M. (1987). What do people think they're doing? Action identification and human 
behaviour. Psychological	Review,	94(1), 3. 
Vandenbroucke, L., Verschueren, K., Ceulemans, E., De Smedt, B., De Roover, K. and Baeyens, D. (2015). Family 
demographic profiles and their relationship with the quality of executive functioning subcomponents in 
kindergarten. British	Journal	of	Developmental	Psychology,	34(2), pp. 226–44. 
Vilhjalmsdottir, A., De Clercq, B., Gardarsdottir, R. B., Bernburg, J. G., & Sigfusdottir, I. D. (2019). Decreasing 
income inequality and adolescent emotional distress: a population-based case study of Icelandic 
adolescents 2006–2016. International	Journal	of	Public	Health,	64(2), 253-263.  
Walpole, M. (2003). Socioeconomic status and college: How SES affects college experiences and outcomes. The	
Review	of	Higher	Education, 27(1), 45-73. 
Watson, B., Osberg, L., & Phipps, S. (2016). Economic insecurity and the weight gain of Canadian adults: A 
natural experiment approach. Canadian	Public	Policy, 42(2), 115-131. 
Wilkinson, R. G. (1997). Socioeconomic determinants of health: Health inequalities: relative or absolute 
material standards?. British	Medical	Journal,	314(7080), 591. 
Wilkinson, R. & Pickett, K. (2009). The	spirit	level. London: Allen Lane. 
Wilkinson, R., & Pickett, K. (2018). The	inner	level:	How	more	equal	societies	reduce	stress,	restore	sanity	and	
improve	everyone’s	well-being. London: Penguin. 
Wilkinson, R. G., & Pickett, K. E. (2017). The enemy between us: The psychological and social costs of inequality. 
European	Journal	of	Social	Psychology,	47(1), 11-24. 
Wilson M., & Daly M. (2004). Do pretty women inspire men to discount the future? Biology	Letters	271(S4):177–
179. 
Young, E. S., Griskevicius, V., Simpson, J. A., Waters, T. E. A., & Mittal, C. (2018). Can an Unpredictable Childhood 
Environment Enhance Working Memory? Testing the Sensitized-Specialization Hypothesis. Journal	of	
Personality	and	Social	Psychology.	Advance	online publication. http://dx.doi.org/10.1037/pspi0000124 
Zhang, M., & Smith, P. K. (2018). Does Power Reduce Temporal Discounting? Commentary on Joshi and Fast 
(2013). Psychological	Science,	29(6), 1010-1019. 
Zhao, T., Jin, X., Song, W., Cui, H., & Ding, J. (2018). How a perceived status change increase consumers’ tendency 
toward consumption through double psychological mechanisms.	Asian	Journal	of	Social	Psychology,	
21(1-2), 65-73. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
